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Abstract
To explain the widely observed phenomenon of credit rationing, Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) propose a theory of random rationing under imperfect information. With a
simple model plausibly expanding the Stiglitz and Weiss setting, we argue that, random
rationing occurs only in some extreme cases and hence is not likely to be a prevalent
phenomenon. We start by illustrating that the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model and
hence random rationing are quite sensitive to the assumption of the ranking of projects.
Given that the ranking is according to the Mean-preserving Spread, there is adverse
selection but no moral hazard. In the absence of moral hazard, random rationing is
almost impossible to occur. Then by presuming the coexistence of adverse selection
and moral hazard, we derive two required conditions for the occurrence of random
rationing. First, random rationing occurs only if collateral has an overall deadweight
cost other than the negative adverse selection eﬀect. As collateral is a widely observed
debt feature in practice, such an overall deadweight cost should not be the case for
the majority of borrowers. Second, the occurrence of random rationing entails that
the potential negative eﬀects of the loan rate, collateral, loan size and any restrictive
debt covenant simultaneously overweigh their positive eﬀects exactly at the current
contracting level. In this case, the zero-proﬁt curve of the lender degenerates to a
single point and borrowers face a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. We conjecture that such a
required condition leaves little space for the signiﬁcance of random rationing.
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1 Introduction
Many borrowers cannot get the loan they demand even if they are willing to pay a higher
interest rate than the lenders are asking. This is a prevalent phenomenon called credit
rationing (Tirole (2006)). As a result in practice, some projects with positive NPV cannot
be ﬁnanced while the interest rate spread is remarkably low.1 The observed credit rationing
deviates from the standard neoclassical assumption which would predict that lenders can
always increase the price (or the interest rate) of loans to clear the market and therefore
there should be no space for the presence of excess demand. The literature resorts to some
imperfections in the credit markets to explain the rationale behind credit rationing, e.g.,
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders (e.g., Jaﬀee and Russell (1976),
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)).
The Stiglitz and Weiss (henceforth S-W) (1981) paper is among the most inﬂuential ones in
the literature.2 S-W proposes a random rationing framework in which the interest rate is
excluded as a rationing device due to adverse selection and moral hazard eﬀects, and then
some apparently identical borrowers are randomly chosen to be creditly rationed. Of course,
they do not argue that random rationing is always the case, but rather that the conditions
for the occurrence of random rationing are easily to meet so that it is signiﬁcant in the
real world. This paper re-examines their work and derives some required conditions for the
occurrence of random rationing. A main conclusion is that random rationing occurs only in
some extreme cases and is unlikely to be a prevalent phenomenon, e.g., the widely observed
credit rationing phenomenon in practice.
In the S-W (1981) model, the bank partitions its borrowers into groups in term of the
expected return of projects. Within each group, borrowers' risk and actions are private
information. For a group of apparently identical borrowers, the expected return received by
1For example, Roberts and Suﬁ (2009) ﬁnd that, for around 16,000 US loans in the Dealscan database
between 1996 and 2005, the interest spread over LIBOR has a mean 2.06% and standard deviation 1.37%.
Berger and Udell (1992) study the dataset from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Bank Lending.
For over 1.1 million US commercial loans from 1977 to 1988, they report the mean and standard deviation
of the interest spread are 2.47% and 2.59% respectively. Black and de Meza (1992) states that the interest
spread is rarely over 3%-4% in UK.
2See Arnold and Riley (2009) for more discussions about the importance of the S-W 1981 paper in
Financial Economics.
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the lender does not increase monotonically with the interest rate due to adverse selection and
moral hazard eﬀects. From the adverse selection aspect, a higher interest rate tends to attract
high-risk borrowers and hence leaves the bank with a worse customer pool; from the moral
hazard aspect, a higher interest rate induces the borrower to choose more risky projects.
In both situations, increasing the interest rate may reduce the bank's return resulting in
a hump-shaped expected return function (see Figure 1). If excess demand exists at the
bank-optimal interest rate, the interest rate will not be chosen as a rationing device. Among
these apparently identical borrowers, some are randomly chosen to be creditly rationed even
if they are willing to pay a higher interest rate. According to Stiglitz and Weiss, random
rationing occurs at the turning point of the expected return function of the bank. Figure 1
illustrates three expected return curves respectively for three diﬀerent borrower groups. In a
competitive credit market, the zero-proﬁt assumption of the bank means that only the group
represented by the solid curve will be rationed. This rationed group is called the marginal
group for which the bank breaks even only at the bank-optimal interest rate, R̂. The upper
and lower curves respectively represent the not-rationed groups and groups that are entirely
rationed out of the market.
Figure 1: Credit Rationing in the sense of S-W (1981)
In the current paper, we construct a simple model following the S-W (1981) setting with
some plausible expansions to re-examine the possibility of random rationing. The paper
proceeds as follows.
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First, we illustrate that the S-W (1981) model is sensitive to its assumption regarding the
ranking of considered projects. If borrower classiﬁcation relies on the expected return of
projects, i.e., all projects in the considered group have the same expected return, adverse
selection is obvious because the lender and the borrower assign inverse rankings to the
projects. Further if the ranking by the lender is according to the Mean-preserving Spread,
moral hazard does not exist because in this special case, the ranking by the borrower is
predetermined ex-ante. In the absence of ex-post risk-shifting, ex-ante risk-sorting through
collateral (Bester (1985, 1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987a)) or the loan size (Besanko and
Thakor (1987b), Milde and Riley (1988)) may be achieved to eliminate random rationing.
Even if collateral (or equity ﬁnance) is not available, Arnold and Riley (2009) document that
random rationing due to adverse selection occurs only under very extreme conditions.
Second, to justify the potential signiﬁcance of random rationing, one must ﬁnd cases that
allow for the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard. Later models by S-W (1986,
1992) do change their 1981 model setting to introduce this coexistence. However, we argue
that the crucial assumptions in these models are not intuitively plausible and require further
clariﬁcations.
Third, we derive two required conditions for the occurrence of random rationing under a
plausibly more general setting than S-W. First, random rationing occurs only if collateral
has an overall deadweight cost other than the negative adverse selection eﬀect. As collateral
is a widely observed debt feature in practice, such an overall deadweight cost should not
be the case for large proportion of borrowers but only for some special group of borrowers,
e.g., the poor-collateralized ﬁrms as observed in practice. However, the existing literature
argues collateral is a binding constraint in ﬁnance for these ﬁrms (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler
(1995), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). If this is true, only (many) borrowers who are
bindingly constrained exactly at the current contracting level face random rationing because
the ones with more collateral can avoid rationing by pledging more collateral.3 This implies
that random rationing should not be a general case. Second, the occurrence of random
rationing entails that the potential negative eﬀects of the loan rate, collateral, loan size and
3This indicates a way to test the signiﬁcance of random rationing by examining whether the creditly
rationed borrowers are still rationed if they are willing to pledge more collateral. Probably due to data
unavailability, such a test is diﬃcult to undertake.
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any restrictive debt covenant simultaneously overweigh their positive eﬀects exactly at the
current contracting level. In this case, the zero-proﬁt curve of the lender degenerates to a
single point and borrowers face a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. We conjecture that such a required
condition leaves little space for the signiﬁcance of random rationing.
In the rest of the paper, section 2 constructs the model, section 3 analyzes the signiﬁcance
of random rationing and section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Model Setting
We consider a competitive credit market under imperfect information.
Projects
There is a continuum of indivisible investment projects (technology) making up a set Ω.
Each project is characterized by a risk-parameter θ and requires one unit of initial invest-
ment. Project θ has stochastic end-of-period payoﬀ x(θ) with distribution function F (x; θ) .
Lenders
Lenders in our model are risk-neutral ﬁnancial intermediaries, e.g., banks, insurance com-
panies and so on. They compete by oﬀering standard debt contracts, (D,R,C) where D
is the loan size, R is the gross loan rate and C is collateral.4 There might be some other
debt variables (e.g., debt covenants), but for simplicity they are ignored in our analysis. The
loanable funds come from depositors. The aggregate supply of loanable funds is a function of
the deposit interest rate δ. We assume all lenders are identical so that a representative lender
will be analyzed. In a competitive credit market, the lender earns zero-proﬁt. We ﬁx the
loan size D and write a contract as (R,C) for convenience reason. Note that endogenizing
D has no conclusive inﬂuence on our results.
Borrowers
4As S-W assumes, the value of collateral is ﬁxed.
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There are a large number of risk-neutral borrowers who are ﬁrms with limited liability. Bor-
rower j is endowed with a set Ωj of projects where Ωj ⊆ Ω. Each borrower will choose one
project to undertake if successfully obtaining the loan.
Information
The makeup of Ω and the return distribution of each project in Ω are common knowledge
for all agents in the market. However, information concerning the projects in Ωj is asym-
metric between the lender and borrower j. First, Ωj is only known to borrower j so that the
borrower j's risk is hidden ex-ante. Second, the lender is also unaware of the exact project
chosen by borrower j, that is, there might be hidden actions ex-post. Due to these two kinds
of information asymmetry, the borrowers are apparently identical.
There are several important diﬀerences between the S-W model and ours. First, while in
the S-W (1981) model the only changeable contract variable is the interest rate, we endo-
genize not only the interest rate but also the other contract variable, C. Second, the S-W
1981 paper models adverse selection and moral hazard separately, but here we combine both
eﬀects in a synthesized model. Third, in the S-W adverse selection model, each borrower is
endowed with only one project. Since we try to address both adverse selection and moral
hazard simultaneously, in our model the opportunity set for each borrower is allowed to
include more than one project. It is worthy of notice that, except being more general, our
model setting completely follows the S-W (1981) model. This makes it possible for us to
re-examine random rationing.
2.2 The Expected Payoﬀs of the Contract Parties
With the signed contract, (R,C), the expected payoﬀ of the chosen project by the borrower,
will be split between the two contract parties. Let the partition to the borrower and lender
be µB(x) and µL(x) respectively.
µB(x) = max(−C, x−R) (1)
µL(x) = min(x+ C,R) (2)
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µB(x) + µL(x) = x (3)
Figure 2: Credit Rationing in the sense of S-W (1981)
Clearly, µB(x) is convex and µL(x) is concave. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
If borrower j signs contract (R,C) with her lender and chooses a project θj, the expected
payoﬀs of borrower j and the lender from θj are respectively
pi(R,C; θj) =
∫ ∞
0
µB(x) dF (x; θj) =
∫ ∞
α
x dF (x; θj) + αF (α, θj)−R (4)
ρ(R,C; θj) =
∫ ∞
0
µL(x) dF (x; θj)− δ =
∫ α
0
x dF (x; θj)− αF (α, θj) +R− δ (5)
where α = R− C. Then with the signed contract (R,C), the lender's expected payoﬀ from
all her borrowers is
Γ(R,C) =
∑
j
ρ(R,C; θj) (6)
At (R,C), the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of the borrower pi = c where c is a positive
constant is
dR
dC
∣∣∣∣
pi=c
= − F (R− C; θ)
1− F (R− C; θ) < 0 (7)
Similarly, it is easy to get from (7) that the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves of the lender
(from an individual borrower or from all borrowers in the considered group) are also negative.
Therefore, the interest rate and collateral can be considered as substitutes for every contract
party.
8
3 Re-examination of Random Rationing
Let's ﬁrst identify an uninteresting case of random rationing. Suppose a mass of borrowers
are perfectly identical so that they break even at the same contracting level. If the loan
supply does not suﬃce to ﬁll in the loan demand from this mass of borrowers, random
rationing might occur in the sense that some of them are randomly chosen to be given credit
but the others to be rationed. This is true not only for the credit market but also for any
kind of markets (e.g., eggs or desks). By any means, it is not a case worthy of study. Given
a continuum of projects and a large number of borrowers, we exclude the above case as a
proof for the potential signiﬁcance of random rationing.
3.1 Ranking of Projects and Sensitivity of the Model
In the model, since the project set Ω is exogenously given, the ranking of projects by the
lender should also be exogenously determined. Moreover, it might be impossible to rank
the projects by a simple rule, e.g., the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD), given the
exogenous distributions of project returns. However, to address incentive problems, it is
required that lenders have speciﬁc preferences over the projects or, equivalently to say, the
lender should assign a ranking of the projects (for any given contract). Therefore, we have
to impose constraints on the set in order to rank the projects by a tractable rule proposed
by the lender. Let's assume that, if two projects are not able to be ranked according to such
a rule, the lender treats them identically and thus all projects in Ω can be ranked according
to the rule.5
We ﬁrst examine the case when the lenders only consider oﬀering a single contract like the
one in the S-W (1981) model.
Assumption 1 (A.1): For the lender, the projects are ranked by a simple rule and the
ranking according to this rule exhibits no inconsistency, i.e., the ranking is identical across
contracts.
5In the whole paper, when we say a project is more risky than the other, we mean the former is preferred
by a lender to the latter. That is, for the lender, risky is interchangeable with bad.
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Lemma 1: (A.1) implies the Second-order Stochastic Dominance (SOSD).
Proof: If in the ranking, θ1 is preferred by the lender to θ2 given a contract (R,C), then
ρ(R,C; θ1) ≥ ρ(R,C; θ2) (8)
⇐⇒
∫ α
0
x dF (x; θ1)− αF (α, θ1) +R− δ ≥
∫ α
0
x dF (x; θ2)− αF (α, θ2) +R− δ (9)
⇐⇒
∫ α
0
x d[F (x; θ1)− F (x; θ2)] ≥ α[F (α, θ1)− F (α, θ2)] (10)
⇐⇒ x [F (x, θ1)− F (x, θ2)]|α0 −
∫ α
0
[F (x, θ1)− F (x, θ2)] dx ≥ α[F (α, θ1)− F (α, θ2)] (11)∫ α
0
[F (x, θ1)− F (x, θ2)] dx ≤ 0 (12)
Equation (12) holds for any contract (R,C), i.e., for all values of α. Obviously this is just
the deﬁnition of the SOSD. Q.E.D.
In the credit rationing literature, an exogenously given rule to rank the projects is common.
For example, two special cases of the SOSD are discussed: the FOSD (De Meza and Webb
(1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987a) and the Mean-preserving Spread in the sense of Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1970) (S-W (1981)). Especially, (A.1) as an assumption generalizes the
S-W 1981 setting. Therefore, concerning the relevance of our purpose, (A.1) is proper. Let's
follow the literature to discuss the two special cases, the FOSD and the MPS.
Proposition 1 (P.1): If the ranking is according to the First-order Stochastic Dominance,
there is no adverse selection when increasing the loan rate or the collateral requirement.
Proof: Recall (4) and (5). Given a project and a contract, the payoﬀs of both contract
parties are non-decreasing on the end-of-period payoﬀ of the project. Therefore, for any two
projects, θ1 and θ2, where θ1 ﬁrst-order stochastic dominates θ2 , both the lender and the
borrower prefer θ1 to θ2.
6 In other words, the rankings of the projects by the lender and
the borrower are identical given the FOSD as the rule of ranking. With the same ranking,
6By the deﬁnition of FOSD, any agent with increasing von-Neumann Morgenstern utility would prefer
the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominant project.
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obviously there's no adverse selection. Q.E.D.
If there's no adverse selection, increasing the loan rate can clear the market. De Meza and
Webb (1987) assume the distributions of project returns are special cases that can be ranked
by the FOSD and then prove that equilibrium must be market clearing. (P.1) generalizes
their conclusion.
Proposition 2 (P.2): If the ranking is according to the Mean-preserving Spread (MPS),
there is adverse selection in the sense that some safer borrowers drop out when increasing
the interest rate or the collateral requirement.
Proof: With MPS, the projects in Ω have the same expected return that will be split be-
tween the two contract parties. With risk-neutrality, the game between the lender and the
borrower is a zero-sum game. Therefore, the lender and the borrower have inverse rankings
of projects and there is adverse selection. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2a (P.2a): As long as all projects have the same expected return, there is
adverse selection. This conclusion is independent of the rule of ranking.
As a generalized version of (P.2), (P.2a) is intermediate given that the ranking by the lender
is inverse to that by the borrower when all projects have the same expected return. Note
that under the MPS, the considered borrower group in our model can be thought as the
marginal group in the S-W (1981) model and thus (P.2a) generalizes their adverse selection
model as well as the Wette (1983) model which addresses the negative adverse selection eﬀect
of collateral.
Figure 3 illustrates (P.1) and (P.2) in a case of two types of risk. Under the FOSD, it is
the risky borrower who drops out ﬁrst when increasing the loan rate or the collateral re-
quirement and therefore there's no adverse selection. In contrast, under the MPS, the safe
project drops out ﬁrst resulting in adverse selection.
Proposition 3 (P.3): In both cases, the Mean-preserving Spread and the First-order
Stochastic Dominance, no moral hazard occurs.
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Figure 3: The Zero-proﬁt Curves of Borrowers
Proof: According to (P.1) and (P.2), the ranking of projects by the borrower is identical
to that by the lender under the FOSD and is inverse to that by the lender under the MPS.
Given (A.1), the ranking by the lender is independent of contracts in both cases, so the
ranking by the borrower is also independent of contracts. With predetermined rankings,
borrowers have no incentive to shift risk of projects thus excluding the possibility of moral
hazard. Q.E.D.
Random rationing pools diﬀerent risks. In the absence of ex-post moral hazard, a branch
of risk-sorting models based on the seminal work by Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976) introduce
some self-selection mechanisms to obtain a separating equilibrium and hence eliminate ran-
dom rationing, for example, collateral (Bester (1985, 1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987a, b))
and the loan size (Besanko and Thakor (1987b), Milde and Riley (1988)). In the general case
of the MPS, the Mirlees-Spence single-crossing condition does not hold and hence perfect
sorting cannot be achieved, but risk-sorting at least mitigates rationing in many plausible
cases (e.g., the two-state case of Bester (1987)).
One may argue that collateral or net worth might be limited for some group of borrowers.
Arnold and Riley (2009) ﬁnd that, even if collateral is excluded, the hump-shaped expected
return function in the S-W (1981) adverse selection model cannot be hump-shaped. The
idea is straight-forward. In a single-contract case, when the lender increases the loan rate,
some safer borrowers drop out resulting in a potential decrease of the expected return. If
the lender continues to increase the loan rate until only one type of borrowers remains
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and breaks even, the lender earns the entire surplus of the remaining projects that is the
maximum expected return she can get. Therefore, the expected return function of the lender
is impossible to be purely hump-shaped. Two cases are possible: monotonically increasing or
ﬁrst hump-shaped and then monotonically increasing. With this ﬁnding, Arnold and Riley
(2009) further illustrate that random rationing occurs only under very extreme conditions.
In sum, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (P.4): In the absence of moral hazard, random rationing only occurs under
very restrictive assumptions.
So far, (P.1) - (P.4) show that our model as well as the S-W (1981) model is very sensitive to
the assumption of the ranking of projects. The following graph is a summary of these above
propositions:
Figure 4: Summary of the First Four Propositions
When the ranking is according to the FOSD or the MPS as discussed in the literature, there
is no moral hazard. However, in the absence of moral hazard, random rationing only occurs
under extreme conditions. It is not diﬃcult to check that in the other cases of the SOSD
than the FOSD and the MPS, the rankings by the borrower might depend on the given
contract restoring the possibility of moral hazard when increasing the interest rate. In these
cases, the information of both the expected return and the risk of projects are required to be
asymmetric between the borrower and the lender. This deviates from the S-W 1981 setting
that within a borrower group, all projects have observed identical return but hidden risk
and that the ranking of these projects is according to the MPS. That is, lenders ﬁrst classify
borrowers into many borrower groups in term of the expected return of their projects, and
then within each group, rank the projects (borrowers) by risk.7 This assumption makes their
7It is an empirical issue whether expected returns are observable and how the lender classiﬁes its borrowers
or loans. Although it is not clear how borrowers are classiﬁed in practice, risk rating seems to play an
important rule. Banks usually have their internal risk rating system (English and Nelson 1998) to rate loans
or borrowers.
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model more tractable. Jaﬀee and Stiglitz (1990) emphasize the MPS as a general assumption
to derive random rationing.
3.2 The Stiglitz and Weiss 1986/1992 Models
Assumption (A.1) in our model as well as the MPS assumption in the S-W (1981) model
excludes the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard and hence the signiﬁcance
of random rationing. In contrast to this conclusion, two other papers by S-W (1986, 1992)
change the original setting in their 1981 model to allow for the coexistence of adverse selection
and moral hazard. These two papers are quite similar, so we consider the S-W 1992 model.
The model has two key assumptions diﬀerent from their 1981 model: ﬁrst, borrowers are
risk averse; second, more wealthy borrowers are less risk averse so that they take more risky
projects.
If borrowers are risk averse, there is risk sharing beneﬁt from the borrowing-lending relation-
ship and hence the game is no longer a zero-sum game even under the MPS assumption.
Let u be the borrowers' von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function where u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0.
With a given project θ, the expected utility of the borrower from contract (R,C) is
pi(R,C; θ) =
∫ ∞
0
u(µB(x)) dF (x; θ) (13)
In (13), µB(x) is convex but u is concave. There's no conclusive property concerning the
concavity (or convexity) of u(µB(x)) on x. Given that the lender has an identical ranking of
projects in Ω across contracts, is the ranking by the borrowers also identical across contracts
(i.e., is the ranking independent of the signed contract)? The answer is no. To give a
simple illustration, let us ﬁx the collateral requirement and think of changing the loan rate
only. Assume there are only two types of projects for simplicity, high-risk and low-risk. On
one hand, u(µB(x)) is concave for some contract − when the loan rate is low enough, µB(x)
is close to be ﬂat and u(µB(x)) is concave. In this case, the borrower and the lender have
the same ranking. The borrower earns lower expected return but higher expected utility
from a low-risk project, so she still prefers the low-risk project. On the other hand, the high-
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risk project may be chosen for some other contracts − when the loan rate is high enough,
the borrower earns nothing from a low-risk project but still positive utility from a high-risk
project. In sum, for any given collateral level, there is a critical value of the loan rate below
which the borrower prefers a low-risk project to a high-risk one and over which the borrower
prefers a high-risk project to a low-risk one.8 This means that increasing the loan rate might
induce moral hazard eﬀects. Therefore, the assumption of risk-averse borrowers allows for
the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard.
The risk-sorting models (e.g., Bester (1985, 1987)) cannot solve the rationing problem if
adverse selection and moral hazard coexist. In this sense, some papers by Stiglitz (e.g.,
S-W (1992), Stiglitz (2001)) argue that the risk-sorting models are special or wrong . In
addition, the Arnold and Riley (2009) conclusion is valid also in the absence of moral haz-
ard. Therefore, the coexistence of both adverse selection and moral hazard makes random
rationing potentially signiﬁcant. However, if borrowers are risk averse, why is the standard
debt contract chosen as the oﬀered contract by the lender? For risk-averse borrowers and
risk-neutral lenders, the optimal contract should allocate a ﬁxed return to borrowers leaving
lenders to bear all the risk. Therefore, more clariﬁcations are required in the S-W model to
reconcile the assumption of risk-averse borrowers with the chosen standard debt contract.
In addition, if more wealthy borrowers are less risk-averse so that they take more risky
projects as S-W (1992) assume, why do lenders not classify borrowers according to their
wealth? It is plausible to assume that information concerning the risk of projects is asym-
metric because the projects are implemented after the contract is signed so that the estima-
tion of risk by the lender is based on the borrower's description of the project. However,
wealth is a current state variable. In most cases wealth of a borrower can be observed by the
lender. If wealth is a strong indicator of risk attitude of borrowers, borrower classiﬁcation
according to the level of wealth should be proﬁtable for the lender.
To sum up, the S-W (1992) model is based on two assumptions that need more reasonable
clariﬁcations. When relaxing these assumptions, the model cannot justify random rationing
8It is intuitive that the critical value is increasing on the collateral level because increasing the collateral
requirement does reduce the incentive of borrowers to take risk. This conclusion in the Stiglitz and Weiss
(1992) model is summarized by a switch line along which the borrower is indiﬀerent between the high-risk
and the low-risk, below which the low-risk is chosen and over which the high-risk is chosen.
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like their 1981 model. In this sense, the conclusions we draw in subsection 3.1 are not
undermined by the S-W 1986/1992 models.
3.3 The Required Conditions for Random Rationing
To justify the potential signiﬁcance of random rationing, one needs to address cases that
allow for the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard. In this section, we derive
two required conditions for the occurrence of random rationing presuming this coexistence.
Let (R̂, Ĉ) denote the equilibrium contract with rationing. To derive the ﬁrst required
condition for random rationing, deﬁne a contracting set around (R̂, Ĉ) in the C − R space,
Φ = {(a, b) : a ∈ [R̂− 1, R̂+ 1], b ∈ [Ĉ − 2, Ĉ + 2]} where 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 are arbitrarily
small real numbers.
Assumption 2 (A.2): at any point (R,C) ∈ Φ, the higher is the risk of a project according
to the ranking by the lender, the steeper the indiﬀerence curve of the borrower who undertakes
the project (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Assumption 2
Note that (A.2) imposes more constraints on the return distributions of projects in Φ. It
is more strict than (A.1) inside set Φ, but it says nothing outside set Φ. The intuition is
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that, given contract (R̂, Ĉ), a risky borrower (i.e., the borrower with a more risky project)
should be more reluctant than a safe one to obtain a reduction of the loan rate by pledging
an increment of the same amount of collateral. Although (A.2) does not hold generally given
the SOSD as the ranking rule, it is reasonable if set Φ is arbitrarily small.9
Figure 6: Proposition 5
Proposition 5 (P.5): Random Rationing occurs only if collateral has a signiﬁcant dead-
weight cost at the current contracting level.
Proof: At the equilibrium contract with rationing, say (R̂, Ĉ), increasing the loan rate re-
sults in adverse selection, so there must be one type of borrowers who exactly breaks even.
We call them the marginal type of borrowers. In Figure 5, the solid curve denotes the zero-
proﬁt curve of the marginal type. Let's consider moving the current contract (R̂, Ĉ) along
this curve to the right-down side, i.e., decreasing the loan rate and increasing the collateral
requirement. On one hand, from (A.1), it is clear that no adverse selection occurs due to this
movement because the zero-proﬁt curves of the other (more risky) types lie above that of the
marginal type. On the other hand, there is no moral hazard because a decrease of the loan
rate and increase of collateral both induce borrowers to reduce risk. Therefore, under the
movement, neither adverse selection nor moral hazard occurs. Moreover, according to (A.2),
9This is consistent with Bester (1985) in the sense that more risky borrowers prefer less collateral.
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the indiﬀerence curves of the other types should be steeper than that of the marginal type
at (R̂, Ĉ) because the marginal type of borrowers is the safest remaining loan applicants.
Therefore, under the movement the lender earns constant proﬁt from the marginal type (i.e.,
the total surplus of the marginal type) and increasing proﬁt from the other types as long as
the movement does not reduce the end-of-period payoﬀ of the projects or, equivalently to say,
as long as collateral does not incur a deadweight cost. Given that the end-of-period payoﬀ
of the projects is given, the movement increases the lender's proﬁt in total. This contradicts
with (R̂, Ĉ) being the equilibrium contract. Thus, collateral must have an overall deadweight
cost to justify random rationing. This deadweight cost should be signiﬁcant enough to oﬀset
the larger proﬁt of the lender. Q.E.D.
Collateral does incur some cost, for example, the inﬂexibility cost for the borrower and
deadweight loss from the ineﬃcient transfer of collateral in the presence of default when
the lender and the borrower have divergent valuations of the pledged collateral (e.g., Barro
(1976)). However, it is well documented in the literature that collateral mitigates ex-post
moral hazard by extracting eﬀorts, reducing risk-taking behavior and other moral hazard
concerns (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997)), reducing enforce-
ment cost (e.g., Banerjee and Newman (1993)) and state veriﬁcation cost (e.g., Townsend
(1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985)). That is, collateral also has positive eﬀects. In practice,
collateral is a widely observed debt feature and, for small and medium businesses (SMEs),
the collateral-debt ratio is near to one.10 This stylized fact shows that an overall deadweight
cost of collateral at the oﬀered contracting level is unlikely to be signiﬁcant across many
groups of borrowers. One interpretation is that an overall negative eﬀect of collateral is
the case only for some special group of borrowers, e.g., poor-collateralized ﬁrms as observed
in practice, so is random rationing. However, another interpretation is widely accepted by
the literature that collateral is a binding constraint in ﬁnance for the poor-collateralized
ﬁrms (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). Are the poor-
collateralized ﬁrms creditly rationed because lenders deny their application even if they are
willing to pledge more collateral (due to an overall negative eﬀect of collateral) or because
10Binks, Ennew and Reed (1988) report that, for 85% of UK business loans, the ratio of collateral provided
to the size of the loan exceeded unity. According to Berger and Udell (1990), in U.S. domestic bank lending,
nearly 70% of all commercial and industrial loans are made on a secured basis.
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collateral is a binding constraint in ﬁnance for them? Note the two possibilities are virtually
diﬀerent concerning the consequent rationing forms. The ﬁrst results in random rationing,
while the second does not. If collateral is a binding constraint, only (many) borrowers who
are bindingly constrained exactly at the current contracting level are randomly chosen to be
rationed. This is similar with the uninteresting case that we discussed at the beginning of
section 3 and which is not the S-W random rationing. Therefore, one way to test the sig-
niﬁcance of random rationing is to examine whether the creditly rationed borrowers are still
rationed if they are willing to pledge more collateral. To our knowledge, so far no research
concerning this test has been done probably because of data unavailability.
Furthermore, collateral and the interest rate are substitutes. If collateral has a signiﬁcant
deadweight cost for a relatively large proportion of borrowers, loan contracts in practice
should exhibit high loan rates but low collateral requirements. This is inconsistent with
the stylized fact that collateral is widely used in loan contracts but the interest rate spread
(margin) is remarkably low (e.g., Binks, Ennew and Reed (1988), Berger and Udell (1990,
1992), Roberts and Suﬁ (2009)). The remarkably low interest spread in the absence of gov-
ernment constraints such as usury laws or interest ceiling together with that high collateral
requirement is strong evidence for the prevalence of credit rationing,11 but this also indicates
that an overall deadweight cost of collateral is unlikely to be similarly prevalent.
(P.5) is derived under (A.1) and (A.2). It is still possible that these assumptions result
in the inconsistency between the potential prevalence of random rationing and the stylized
facts in practice. What we have in mind is that, in some cases of the SOSD that have not
been discussed in the literature, adverse selection and moral hazard might coexist to allow
for the occurrence of random rationing in relatively general cases. Now let release (A.1)
and (A.2) to get another required condition for random rationing. Obviously, to exclude
the loan rate as a rationing device, the expected return function of the bank should not be
always increasing on the loan rate. In the literature, it seems to be a common belief that
this non-monotonic expected return function on the loan rate is also a suﬃcient condition
for the occurrence of random rationing.12 This is not true. If the lender can choose any
11A possible alternative explanation is that all projects in practice are quite safe.
12Much evidence comes from that many papers only ﬁnd a hump-shaped expected return function of the
lender on the loan rate (e.g., due to bankruptcy cost) and then claim the occurrence of random rationing.
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instrument (e.g., contract variable) other than the loan rate to clear the market, random
rationing cannot occur. Therefore, random rationing does require every contract term has
an overall negative eﬀect at the current contracting level.
Proposition 6 (P.6): Random rationing occurs only if the potential negative eﬀects of the
loan rate, collateral, loan size (or self-ﬁnance) and any restrictive debt covenant simultane-
ously overweigh their positive eﬀects exactly at the current contracting level.
Only if excess demand still exists after lenders exhaust all the instruments (contract vari-
ables) to ration credit, random rationing is possible. In this case, the zero-proﬁt curve of
the lender degenerates to a single point that is the maximum point of the expected return
function of the lender. For the considered borrowing group with random rationing, the
lender breaks even only at the lender-optimal contract that is not only the single choice of
the lender but also a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer for borrowers in the considered group.13 S-W
(1992) also proposes three required conditions for the occurrence of random rationing, among
which the second one is the adverse selection/ adverse incentive eﬀects of changing interest
rates or the non-price terms of the contract must be suﬃciently strong (at some values of
the relevant variables) that it is not optimal for the lender to use these instruments fully to
allocate credit. This required condition is consistent to the one proposed by (P.6). Note that
(P.6) is derived under very general setting. Such a required condition, even if being logically
possible, is extremely strict leaving little space for the signiﬁcance of random rationing.
De Meza and Webb (2006) ﬁnd that random rationing implies inﬁnite marginal cost of funds
to the borrower, so the borrower has an overwhelming incentive to cut their loans by a dollar
and avoid rationing. Their model endogenizes the loan size by assuming that borrowers are
able to access some self-ﬁnance through reducing current consumption, delaying the project
to collect internal funds, etc. Implicitly in their model lenders can use the loan size (or
self-ﬁnance) to clear the market, i.e., decreasing the loan size (or increasing self-ﬁnance) at
the pooling contract beneﬁts the lender. From (P.6), we can see that this assumption itself
has already excluded the possibility of random rationing.
13Note that here for convenience we exclude the case in which there is a continuum of local maximum
points.
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4 Concluding Remarks
Why are many projects with positive NPV not able to get ﬁnanced while the interest rate
spread is remarkably low or why can't borrowers with these projects obtain the loan they need
by increasing the loan rate? This issue is of importance not only because of its practical
signiﬁcance but also because of its implication for the money transmission merchanism.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in their seminal paper give the ﬁrst explanation of the true credit
rationing based on adverse selection and moral hazard due to imperfect information. In this
paper, we reexamine their model, derive two required conditions for the occurrence of the
S-W random credit rationing and conclude that, even if being logically possible, random
rationing occurs under extremely strict conditions and hence is not likely to be a widely
observed phenomenon.
Some empirical research does not ﬁnd evidence in favor of the signiﬁcance of credit rationing
(e.g., Berger and Udell (1992)), which is consistent with the ﬁnding of Riley (1987), Arnold
and Riley (2009) and this paper. A ﬁrm denied credit by one institution will simply go
to another one and eventually obtain a loan (Gale and Hellwig (1985)). While the Stiglitz
and Weiss adverse selection model (1981) is based on ex-ante asymmetric information, many
other models assume information is symmetric ex ante and focus on illustrating how ex-post
agency problems stemming from a speciﬁc borrowing-lending relationship induce credit ra-
tioning, e.g., costly state veriﬁcation (Williamson (1987)), money diversion (Hart & Moore
(1994)), hidden eﬀort (Holmstrom & Tirole (1997)) and limited enforcement (Krasa and Vil-
lamil (2000)). Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) illustrate how
poor-collateralized ﬁrms can be credit rationed because collateral (or net worth) is a binding
constraint in corporate ﬁnance. Essentially, the rationale in these models is diﬀerent from
the S-W random rationing. This leaves a possible way to test the signiﬁcance of random
rationing by examining whether the credit rationed borrowers are still rationed if they are
willing to pledge more collateral, to reduce the loan size and to add restrictive covenants.
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